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ABSTRACT
I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological
character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the so-called
Hole Argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to
distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate
arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like
relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one
must fix an investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different
investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about
spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more
fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several
different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of
the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to
the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists.
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[W]e must bear in mind that the scientific or science-producing value of the efforts
made to answer these old standing questions is not to be measured by the prospect
they afford us of ultimately obtaining a solution, but by their effect in stimulating men
to a thorough investigation of nature. To propose a scientific question presupposes
scientific knowledge, and the questions which exercise men’s minds in the present state
of science may very likely be such that a little more knowledge would shew us that
no answer is possible. The scientific value of the question, How do bodies act on one
another at a distance? is to be found in the stimulus it has given to investigations into
the properties of the intervening medium.
James Clerk Maxwell
“Attraction”, Encyclopædia Brittanica (9th ed.)
[B]etween a cogent and enlightened “realism” and a sophisticated “instrumentalism”
there is no significant difference—no difference that makes a difference.
Howard Stein
“Yes, but. . . —Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism”
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1 Introduction
The revival of the debate in recent years in the broader community of philosophers over the ontic
status of spacetime can trace its roots, in part, to its revival in the community of physicists. Belot
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(1996) and Belot and Earman (2001), for instance, claim that philosophers ought to take the
debate seriously because many physicists do. I do not think that fact suffices as a good reason for
philosophers to take the debate as interesting, much less even well posed, and so enter into it. The
active work of physicists on our best physical theories should provide the fodder for the work of
the philosopher of physics most of the time. Sometimes, however, the physicists are confused or
just mistaken, and it is then our job to try to help set matters straight. I believe that is the case
here.1
Other philosophers in recent work have taken inspiration from the traditional debates them-
selves. Maudlin (1993), for instance, after a pre`cis of the debate in the 17th and 18th centuries and
Kant’s attempt to sidestep it, concludes, “[G]ranting that the world is an sich a spatiotemporal
object, we must face a fundamental problem: Are space and time entities in their own right?” In
this paper, I dispute that “must.”
A virtue of Maudlin’s approach, which his work shares with that of many other contemporary
philosophers no matter their inspiration, is the foundation of his arguments on the structures of
our best physical theories and the use of those structures to guide metaphysical argument. I think
the method falls short, however, in so far as it treats those structures in abstraction from their uses
in actual scientific enterprises, both theoretical and experimental. This lacuna leaves the debate
merely formulaic, without real content, at the mercy of clever sophistications without basis in real,
empirically grounded scientific knowledge in the fullest sense.
Stein (1994, p. 1) sums up the situation as I see it admirably. I quote him at length, as he says
it better than I could:
[L]et me . . . hazard a rough diagnosis of the reason why some things that are (in my
view) true, important, and obvious tend to get lost sight of in our discussions. I think
“lost sight of” is the right phrase: it is a matter of perspective, of directions of looking
and lines of sight. As at an earlier time philosophy was affected by a disease of system-
building—the e´sprit de syste`me against which a revulsion set in toward the end of the
last century—so it has (I believe) in our own time been affected by an excess of what
might be called the e´sprit de technique. . . : a tendency both to concentrate on such
matters of detail as allow of highly formal systematic treatment (which can lead to
the neglect of important matters on which sensible even if vague things can be said),
and (on the other hand), in treating matters of the latter sort, to subject them to
quasi-technical elaboration beyond what, in the present state of knowledge, they can
profitably bear. [W]hat I have described can be characterized rather precisely as a
species of scholasticism. . . . In so far as the word “scholasticism,” in its application
to medieval thought, has a pejorative connotation, it refers to a tendency to develop
sterile technicalities—characterized by ingenuity out of relation to fruitfulness; and to
a tradition burdened by a large set of standard counterposed doctrines, with stores of
arguments and counterarguments. In such a tradition, philosophical discussion becomes
something like a series of games of chess, in which moves are largely drawn from a
familiar repertoire, with occasional strokes of originality—whose effect is to increase
1See Curiel (2009) for extensive arguments to this effect on closely related matters, and for a defence of this
claim as a fruitful philosophical attitude.
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the repertoire of known plays.
In the spirit of Stein’s diagnosis, rather than something formally sophisticated I’m going to propose
something crude and simple: in order to try to avoid the sort of sterility that purely formal technical
elaboration can lead to, we should look at the way that spacetime structures are used in practice
to model real systems in order to try to make progress on issues closely related to those treated
in the standard debate. For I do think that there are important, deep questions that we can
make progress on in the vicinity of that debate, questions of the sort that Maxwell alludes to in
the passage I quoted as one of this paper’s epigraphs. As Maxwell intimates, however, in order
for such questions to be investigated profitably, they must be such as to support and stimulate
“the investigation of nature.” And that, I submit, can be accomplished only when the questions
bear on scientific knowledge in all its guises, as theoretical comprehension and understanding, as
evidential warrant and interpretative tool in the attempt to assimilate novel experimental results,
as technical and practical expertise in the design and performance of experiments, and as facility
in the bringing together of theory and experiment in such a way that each may fruitfully inform
the other.
To that end, in this paper I will argue that the way to find the philosophically and scientifically
fruitful gold in the metaphysical dross is to formulate and address the questions in a way that ex-
plicitly makes contact with both the theoretical and the experimental aspects of our best current
knowledge about the kinds of physical system at issue. One way of trying to do that is to pose and
investigate the questions explicitly in the context of what I will call an investigative framework:
roughly speaking, a set of more or less exactly articulated and fixed theoretical structures for the
modeling of physical systems, along with a family of experimental practices and techniques suited
to the investigation of the type of systems the theoretical tools appropriately model, in the way
the theory actually models them. Different investigative frameworks, as I show by constructive ex-
ample, provide different natural criteria with which to render determinate content to the question
of the ontic status of spacetime, with none privileged sub specie æternitatis over any of the others.
Those different criteria yield different answers to the question, suitably formulated in the given
frameworks. This should not be surprising, I think. After all, different sorts of scientific investi-
gations naturally assume and rely on different relations between individual spacetime points and
metrical (and other forms of spatiotemporal) structure, and it is those relations that are supposed
to serve as the criteria for existence of individual spacetime points; the mathematical formalism of
the theory does not by itself fix a univocal relation with clear physical significance between points
of the spacetime manifold and geometrical structures, both local and global ones, that live on the
manifold. I therefore dispute not only the force of Maudlin’s “must,” but even more the cogency
of the demand itself, baldly formulated.
I begin in §2 with an examination of a popular argument, the so-called Hole Argument, that
seems to urge a form of relationalism. I do this for two reasons. First, because advertence to the
argument has become something of a mannerism in the debate, it must be confronted; I conclude
that it has no bearing one way or another on the issues the debate purports to address. Second,
I discuss it because it yields a useful schema for the production of concrete criteria in the terms
of which one can try to explicate the difference between substantivalists and relationalists, such
as it is. I use that schema—whether the identification of spacetime points must depend on the
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prior stipulation of metrical structure—to frame the argument of the subsequent two sections of
the paper. In each of those two sections I make the schematic criterion concrete in the context
of a particular form of investigative framework so as to construct two arguments with contrary
conclusions, one in support of something like relationalism and the other something like substan-
tivalism to show that one can make the debate concrete in any of a number of precise, physically
significant ways, none a priori privileged over the others, and that those ways will not in general
agree in their consequences.2
The opposed arguments and contrary conclusions of §§3–4, in conjunction with the dismissal
of the Hole Argument, do not decisively refute the claim that there is a single, canonical way
to explicate the idea of a spacetime point and so to enter into debate over the existence of such
a thing. As I urge in §5, they strongly suggest it is a question best settled in the context of a
particular form of investigation. The investigation itself in tandem with pragmatic considerations
and æsthetic predilections will guide the investigator in settling the form of the question and so
the search for its answer. For a given spacetime theory, and even a given model within the theory,
depending on one’s purposes and the tools one allows oneself, either one can treat spacetime
points as entities and individuate and identify them a priori, or one can in any of a number of
ways construct spacetime points as factitious, convenient pseudo-entities, as it were. Nothing of
intrinsic physical significance hangs on the choice, and so a fortiori science cannot guide us if we
attempt to choose sub specie æternitatis between the alternatives—such a choice must become, if
anything, an exercise in scholastic metaphysics only.
In §6, I extend the discussion to a host of other types of spacetime structure, such as Killing
fields and topological invariants. The attempt to formulate criteria for the physicality of such
other structures adds weight to the conclusion that such questions require concrete realization in
the context of something akin to real science in order to acquire substantive content. I conclude in
§7 with a brief attempt to show that the arguments of this paper ramify into the debate between
realists and instrumentalists more generally, by dint, in part, of the picture of science the arguments
implicitly rely on. The overarching lesson I draw is that metaphysical argumentation abstracted
from the pragmatics of the scientific enterprise as we know it—science as an actually achieved state
of knowledge and as an ongoing enterprise of inquiry—is vain. Very little of real substance can be
2I do not know of anyone in the literature who adopts exactly the schematic criterion I propose to found my two
arguments. (Perhaps Hoefer 1996, 1998 comes the closest.) I use it because I think it captures the flavor of the criteria
that are often stipulated when one or the other position is being argued for or against, viz., schematically speaking,
that the question of the existence of spacetime points boils down to the relation of those points to some fixed,
underlying geometrical structure, such as the metric. (See, e.g., Earman 1989, Maudlin (1990, 1993), Butterfield
1989, Rynasiewicz 1994, Belot 1999, Dorato 2000, Huggett 2006, Pooley 2006, Pooley 2013, Belot 2011.) This is
all I require for the overall argument of the paper. I use this particular schema, moreover, as only one example of
the sort of criterion one could with some justification rely on in this debate, not because I think it is canonical or
privileged in some way, but because it is popular and has a lot to say for it prima facie. My hope is that showing
how the debate breaks down when this particular criterion is used will, at the least, strongly suggest that it would
similarly break down no matter what sort of purely formal criterion of that sort one used. DiSalle (1994), DiSalle
(2006) is a notable example of a contemporary philosopher who takes an approach much more sympathetic to my
own. (See Friedman 2007 for a thoughtful discussion of DiSalle’s work.) Robert Geroch (in private conversation) is
a notable example of a contemporary physicist who does so. Dorato (2006) is an interesting case of a philosopher
who agrees with me that the contemporary debate is not well posed, but thinks there is a best answer to a proper
reformulation of the debate. Rynasiewicz (1996) agrees with me that the contemporary debate is not well posed,
but he uses arguments I would not completely endorse.
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learned about the nature of the physical world by studying only theoretical structures in isolation
from how they hook up to experimental knowledge in real scientific practice, as is the endemic
practice in the current debate. In particular, tracking the alleged ontological commitments of a
theory based on an analysis of its formal structure alone is not a viable approach to the issue,
as we cannot know what structures the theory provides have real physical significance, and what
sort of real physical significance they do have, unless we understand how the theory is successfully
applied in practice.
The constructions I found the arguments on require the use of advanced mathematical ma-
chinery from the theory of general relativity. The format of the paper does not allow for an
introduction to most of it. (For the interested reader, Wald 1984 or Malament 2012, for example,
contains comprehensive coverage of all material required.) I have tried to segregate it as much as
possible so that those who do not want to trudge through it will not have to while still following
the general argument. For those who do want to skip most of the technical material, I recommend
the following: in §2, ignore the sketch of the Hole Argument (the second and third paragraphs of
the section), but read the rest; in §3, read the first two paragraphs and the last one; in §4, read
the first two paragraphs (including definition 4.1), and the final two paragraphs. (The remainder
of the paper should not pose strenuous technical difficulties.) This course will convey almost the
entirety of my argument, bar supportive details the technical material purports to provide.
2 The Hole Argument
In recent times, several physicists and philosophers have construed Einstein’s infamous Hole Argu-
ment so as to place it at the heart of questions about the ontic status of spacetime points. Its lesson,
so claimed, is that one cannot identify spacetime points without reliance on metrical structure,
that there is no “bare manifold of points”, as it were, under the metric field,3 though Einstein
himself originally formulated the Hole Argument to highlight what he regarded as problems of
indeterminism for any generally covariant theory.4
This, in brief, is the argument. Fix a spacetime (M, gab). For ease of exposition, we stipulate
that the spacetime be globally hyperbolic, and so possesses a global Cauchy surface, Σ. (We could
do without this condition at the cost of unnecessary technical details.) Say that we know the
metric tensor on Σ and on the entire region of spacetime to its causal past, J−[Σ]. (Note that
J−[Σ] contains Σ.) It is known that this forms a well set Cauchy problem, and so there is a solution
to the Einstein field equation that uniquely extends gab on J
−[Σ] to a metric tensor on all of M,
yielding the original spacetime we fixed.5 In particular, the solution to the Cauchy problem fixes
the metric on the region to the causal future of Σ, J+[Σ]. Now, let φ be a diffeomorphism that is
3See, e.g., Belot (1996) and Gaul and Rovelli (2000).
4See Einstein (1914) and Einstein and Grossmann (1914) for two versions of the original argument, Norton (1989,
1993) for historical and critical discussion, and Earman and Norton (1987) for the introduction of the argument to
the contemporary philosophical debate.
5This is not, strictly speaking, accurate. If no restrictions are placed on the form of the metric, then in general
the initial-value problem is not well set. Indeed, even a few known “physical” solutions to the Einstein field equation
possess no well set initial-value formulation, for example those representing homogeneous dust and some types of
perfect fluid. (See, e.g., Geroch 1996.) We can ignore these technicalities for our purposes, though it may raise a
serious problem for those who worry about indeterminism in the theory, one which, to the best of my knowledge,
has not been addressed in the literature.
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the identity on J−[Σ] and smoothly becomes non-trivial on J+[Σ] − Σ. No matter what else one
takes the significance of the diffeomorphism invariance of general relativity to be, at a minimum it
must include the proposition that the application of a diffeomorphism to a solution of the Einstein
field equation yields another, possibly distinct solution. Apply φ to gab (but not to M itself);
this yields a seemingly different metric—a different “physical state of the gravitational field”—on
J+[Σ]−Σ, in the sense that the same points of J+[Σ]−Σ now carry (in general) a different value
for the metric. This is the crux of the issue, that the diffeomorphism applied to the metric has
yielded a different tensor field in the sense that the same points of the spacetime manifold now
carry a different metric tensor than before.
We now face a dilemma, the argument continues (Earman and Norton 1987): we can either
hold that the fixation of the metric on J−[Σ] does not determine the metric on J+[Σ]−Σ, a radical
form of seeming indeterminism, or else we can conclude that spacetime points in some sense have
no identifiability or existence or what-have-you independent of the prior fixation of the metric
tensor. The argument concludes that the denial of the independent existence of spacetime points
is the lesser of the evils (or, depending on one’s viewpoint, the greater of the goods).6
I want to make a crude and simple proposal, for it seems to me that the debate has lost sight of a
crude and simple, and yet fundamentally important, fact: just because the mathematical apparatus
of a theory appears to admit particular mathematical manipulations does not eo ipso mean that
those manipulations admit of physically significant interpretation, much less that those apparently
mathematical manipulations are even coherent in and of themselves.7 One has the mathematical
structure of the theory; one is not free to do whatever it is one wants with that formalism and then
claim, with no foundation in practice, that what one has done has physical import.8 Once one
6Though it does not seem to be recognized in the literature, there are two different versions of the argument used
by different investigators. The one I rehearse here can be thought of, in a sense, as a generalization of the other. The
more specialized form, which Einstein himself formulated and used, assumes that spacetime has a region of compact
closure, the nominal hole, which is devoid of ponderable matter (i.e., in which the stress-energy tensor vanishes)
though it itself is surrounded by a region of non-trivial stress-energy; the diffeomorphism is then stipulated to vanish
everywhere except in the hole, and the argument goes more or less as in the general case, with the emendation that
now it is the distribution of ponderable matter that does not suffice to fix the physical state of the gravitational
field. (Earman 1989, for example, uses the more general argument, whereas Stachel 1993 uses the more specialized
form.) I think the specialized form of the argument introduces a dangerously misleading red herring, viz., physical
differences between regions of spacetime with non-vanishing stress-energy and those without. There seems to me
no principled way within the context of the theory itself to distinguish between such regions in a way that bears on
metaphysical or ontological issues. One of the regions, that with stress-energy, has non-trivial Ricci curvature; the
other does not, though it may have non-trivial Weyl curvature. That difference by itself, the only one formulable
strictly based on the theory, can tell us nothing in the abstract about the ontic status of the spacetime manifold.
The introduction of the difference seems rather to bespeak an old prejudice that material sources should suffice to
determine the physical state of associated fields, but this is not true even in classical Maxwell theory. Indeed, the
issue seems much less of a problem in general relativity, for in the case of the Maxwell field we cannot determine
a physically unique solution without imposing boundary conditions; otherwise, we are always free to add a field
with vanishing divergence and curl to a solution to yield another that will have different physical effects on charged
bodies. In general relativity, one does not need to do anything of the sort to determine a physically unique solution,
so long as the initial data is well behaved in the first place. (See, e.g., Wald 1984, ch. 10, pp. 243–268.)
7Weatherall (2014), whose conclusions I endorse, argues vigorously that the sort of manipulation employed in the
standard form of the Hole Argument does not make even mathematical sense. For the sake of argument, however,
I will assume here that it does. (If one likes, one can take that assumption as being in the service of a reductio.)
8Stachel (1993, p. 149) describes the attitude in the literature towards arbitrariness nicely:
A current trend among some philosophers of science is toward what I will call “the fetishism of mathe-
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has the mathematical formalism in hand, one must determine what one is allowed to do with it,
“allowed” in the sense that what one does respects the way that the formalism actually represents
physical systems. A simple example will help explain what I mean: adding 3-vectors representing
spatial points in Newtonian mechanics. This shows the need for an investigative context for the
fixing of what counts as admissible manipulations of the mathematical formalism, for as a physical
operation adding spatial points makes no sense (there is no sense to be had from the idea of linearly
superposing two different spatial points in Newtonian theory as a representation of a physical state
of affairs), but for the purposes of computing factitious quantities such as the center of mass, it
does make sense (though, again, not as an operation that has a physical correlate in the world).
General relativity, in its usual incarnation, is formulated with the use of differential manifolds
with pseudo-Riemannian metrics. It does not ipso facto follow that every well formed mathematical
operation one can perform on a manifold with such a metric has physical significance. It arguably
makes mathematical sense to apply a diffeomorphism of the manifold to the metric only, and not
to the underlying manifold at the same time. That fact by itself does not imbue the operation with
physical significance. It is exactly considerations such as the Hole Argument highlights that show
how diffeomorphisms ought to be applied to solutions of the Einstein field equation so as to have
physical significance. When one applies a diffeomorphism, one must apply it to both the manifold
and the metric. No other procedure has physical content.9
The Hole Argument is obviated by the fact that the application of φ to the manifold cum metric
results only in a different presentation of the same intrinsic metrical structure. All observers, no
matter which diffeomorphic presentation of the manifold cum metric they use in their respective
models, will agree on what is of intrinsic physical significance in the possible interaction of physical
systems. (Are those two bodies in physical contact? Is heat flowing from this one to that or vice-
versa? Can a light-signal be sent from this to that? Is gravitational radiation present? And so on.)
There is no logical or physical contradiction in taking different diffeomorphic presentations of the
manifold cum metric each as the representation of the same physical structure. One must simply
stipulate that, in the context of general relativity, the application of a diffeomorphism to the metric
is a physically well defined procedure only when one also applies it to the (given presentation of
the) manifold itself. The worry about determinism thus evaporates, doing away with the dilemma.
How one then goes on to try to characterize the ontic nature of spacetime points, if that is the sort
matics.” By this I mean the tendency to assume that all the mathematical elements introduced in the
formalization of a physical theory must necessarily correspond to something meaningful in the physical
theory and, even more, in the world that the physical theory purports to help us understand.
9If one adopts a certain definition of a differential manifold, viz., that it is an equivalence class of “diffeomorphic
presentations”, then one will say that the proposed operation does not make even purely mathematical sense. (S2, for
example, can presented as a certain submanifold of R3, or as a certain submanifold of a 17-dimensional hyperbolid,
or simply as a manifold in its own right; S2 × R2 can be presented, as here, as a direct product of manifolds, or
as R4 with a line removed; and so on.) In this case, “pushing tensors around on the manifold by a diffeomorphism
without also pushing the points around”, as required by the Hole Argument, is not an unambiguous notion, for
strictly speaking manifold points are defined only up to diffeomorphism in the first place. I do in fact accept that
definition of a differential manifold, but I am trying to be as charitable as possible to the proponents of the debate
and the arguments standardly deployed in its carrying out, so I am willing to grant for the sake of argument that the
required manipulations make mathematical sense. In any event, it is not only philosophers who explicitly attempt
to manipulate manifolds and objects in them, in the context of general relativity, in the way the Hole Argument
requires; see, e.g., Pons and Salisbury (2005) for physicists explicitly doing so.
Erik Curiel 8 September 4, 2014
On the Existence of Spacetime Structure
of thing one is into, may be influenced by this restriction on the applicability of diffeomorphisms
to solutions of the Einstein field equation, or it may not. The point of fundamental importance
is that this restriction results from both pragmatic and semantic considerations about the way
that one may employ the formal apparatus the theory provides so as to respect how solutions to
the Einstein field equation represent physically possible spacetimes in practice—how it is that the
formal structures of the theory acquire real physical meaning.
In sum, I do not see why the Hole Argument drives one to conclude that one should or should
not attribute some form of existence to spacetime points independent of the metrical structure.
There is no logical or physical contradiction, for example, in taking the image of a point under the
action of φ to be “the same spacetime point” as its pre-image, as depicted in a different presentation
of spacetime, irrespective of metrical structure. In this case, a spacetime point would be something
like an equivalence class of ordinary mathematical points under the relation of being related by a
diffeomorphism. An exact formulation that avoids having this idea collapse into triviality—given
any finite number of points on a manifold, there is a diffeomorphism that maps those points onto
any permutation of them, which seems to leave one with a single equivalence class containing all
points—requires some refinement. One could do something like the following: a spacetime point is
a physical entity that one can uniquely, or at least adequately and reliably, individuate and identify
by what is of intrinsic physical significance at the physical event that occupies it, no matter the
diffeomorphic presentation of the manifold of events; it is an entity, in other words, individuated
and identified by the equivalence class of physical events under diffeomorphic presentation.10 If
one wants to respond that bare spacetime points per se even with what are tantamount to unique
labels attached are dependent on physical phenomena under this definition and inobservable to
boot, and so unnecessary in the formulation of physical theory, so as to conclude that they have no
independent metaphysical existence of one sort or another, I would not necessarily disagree, but
neither should I think that one requires the Hole Argument to make the point, for the game of the
Hole Argument is that one cannot identify spacetime points in the absence of metrical structure.
One need not invoke or rely on metrical structure to make the sort of identification I suggest, as I
will show by construction in §4.
The basis for my rejection of the Hole Argument, that a proper understanding of diffeomor-
phism invariance and the way to properly implement it as a formal procedure vitiates it, rests on a
deeper point. I think the most unproblematic and uncontroversial claim one can make about diffeo-
morphic freedom is that it embodies an irremediable mathematical arbitrariness in the apparatus
provided by general relativity for the modeling of physical systems: the choice of the presentation
of the spacetime manifold and metric one uses to model a physical system is fixed only up to
diffeomorphism.11 There are restrictions on how one can apply diffeomorphisms to solutions in
10Such a characterization would not necessarily rely on metrical structure at a point since, in general, one needs
to fix the physical state on an open neighborhood of a point in order to fix the metric structure at that point by
way of the Einstein field equation; one cannot solve the Einstein field equation “point by point”, as it were. The
easiest way to see this is to note the non-uniqueness of vacuum solutions. This is intimately bound up with the fact
that the value of the stress-energy tensor at a point does not determine the value of the Weyl tensor (conformal
structure) at that point.
11Einstein (1924) makes the point himself: “The fact that the general theory of relativity has no preferred space-
time coordinates which stand in a determinate relation to the metric is more a characteristic of the mathematical
form of the theory than of its physical content.”
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practice in order for that application to be consistent with the physical content of the theory, and
those restrictions may have philosophical significance, but they may not as well. By itself, that
there is arbitrariness tells us nothing of interest about the theory.
A comparison is edifying. Classical mechanics as embodied in either Lagrangian or Hamilto-
nian mechanics has a similar arbitrariness, slightly different in each formulation of the theory. In
Lagrangian mechanics, one is free to choose the Lagrangian function itself on the tangent bundle
of configuration space up to the addition of a scalar field derived from a closed 1-form on con-
figuration space (or, in more traditional terms, up to the addition of a total time-derivative of
a function of configuration coordinates) without changing the family of solutions the Lagrangian
determines.12 In Hamiltonian mechanics, one is free to choose any symplectomorphism between
the space of states and the cotangent bundle of configuration space, i.e., one may choose, up to
symplectomorphism, any presentation of phase space (or, in more traditional terms, any complete
set of canonical coordinates), without changing the family of solutions the Hamiltonian function
determines.13 One feels no lack of understanding of Lagrangian mechanics, no lacuna in its con-
ceptual resources, merely because one is free to choose the form of the Lagrangian with wide
latitude; just so, in Hamiltonian mechanics one is not driven to investigate the ontic status of
points in phase space or of the physical quantities whose values one uses to label those points,
which ones get nominated ‘configuration’ and which ‘momentum’, merely because one is free to
choose whatever symplectomorphism one likes in its presentation. Consider the fact that one can
run an argument analogous to the Hole Argument in the context of Hamiltonian mechanics, substi-
tuting “phase space” for “spacetime manifold”, “symplectomorphism” for “diffeomorphism” and
“symplectic structure” for “metric”. Does that show anything of intrinsic physical significance?
No serious person would argue so. And in this case, it would be manifestly absurd to “apply a
symplectomorphism only to the symplectic structure and not the underlying manifold”: in general
the underlying manifold is a cotangent bundle and the symplectic structure is the canonical one on
it; pushing the symplectic structure around on its own will yield a new symplectic structure that is
not the canonical one, and so one manifestly unphysical for the purpose of formulating Hamilton’s
equation.
The choice of Lagrangian or the choice of symplectomorphism rests on nothing more than
pragmatic considerations of the type adumbrated by Carnap (1956) in his discussion of the choice
of a linguistic framework for the investigation of philosophical and physical problems.14 One
chooses on the basis of nothing more than what puts one at ease in any of a variety of ways,
from pragmatic considerations such as what will be simple or useful for a particular investigation,
to those based on historical custom and æsthetic predilection. It is clear that the existence of
inevitable, more or less arbitrary, non-physical elements in the presentation of the models of a
theory by itself does not require of one a decision on the ontic status of any entities putatively
designated by the mathematical structures of either Lagrangian or Hamiltonian mechanics. More
to the point, it is clear in these cases that the physical significance of the theory’s models is not
masked or polluted by the unavoidable arbitrariness in the details of their presentations.
12See, e.g., Curiel (2012).
13Op. cit.
14This is not to say that I consider the choice of a Lagrangian or a symplectomorphic presentation of phase space
to be the choice of a Carnapian linguistic framework, only that the sorts of considerations that go into each choice
are similar.
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In the same way, the diffeomorphic freedom in the presentation of relativistic spacetimes does
not ipso facto require philosophical elucidation, in so far as it in no way prevents us from focusing
on and investigating what is of true physical relevance in systems that general relativity models,
what one may think of as the intrinsic physics of the systems, so long as one respects the pragmatic
conditions for the application of diffeomorphisms to solutions. It is neither formal relations nor
substantive entities that remain invariant when one applies a diffeomorphism to a relativistic
spacetime; it is the family of physical facts the spacetime represents. (This line of thought already
strongly suggests that the debate between substantivalists and relationalists is not well posed.)
One may represent those facts in a language some of whose primitive terms designate “spacetime
points” or not. Further, one may want to restrict the attribution of existence to what has intrinsic
physical significance in the context of our best physical theories. Then again, one may not. It is
irrelevant to our capacity to use them in profitable ways in science and, more important, to our
comprehension of those facts and our understanding of the role they play in our broader attempts
to comprehend the physical world.
In the end, however, the most serious problem I have with the Hole Argument, and all other
arguments analogous to it, comes to this: nothing I can see militates in favor of taking the Hole
Argument as bearing on the ontic status of spacetime points, just because the Hole argument
by itself provides no independent, clear and precise criterion for what “existence independent of
metrical structure” comes to. That idea has no substantive content on its own. In the next two
sections, I will show this by exhibiting two plausible, precise criteria for what the idea may mean in
the contexts of two different types of investigation, which in the event lead respectively to opposed
conclusions.
3 Limits of Spacetimes
In this section, I propose an argument in favor of the view that one cannot identify spacetime points
in the absence of metrical structure, and so, a fortiori, that one cannot attribute to the spacetime
manifold any existence independent of that structure; the provision of a precise criterion for the
existence of spacetime structure, grounded in both the structure and the application of physical
theory, grounds the argument. In the event, two criteria natural to the investigative context will
suggest themselves, a weaker one based on the idea of the identifiability of spacetime points and a
stronger one based on their existence (in a precise sense).
To treat a spacetime as the limit, in some sense, of an ancestral family of continuously changing
spacetimes is one of the ways of embodying in the framework of general relativity two of the most
fundamental and indispensable tools in the physicist’s workshop: the idealization of a system by
means of the suppression of complexity, so as to render the system more tractable to investigation;
and the enrichment of a system’s representation in a theory by the addition (or reimposition)
of complexity previously ignored (or ellided) in the model the theory provides for the system.
As a general rule, the fewer degrees of freedom a system has, the easier it becomes to study.
Schwarzschild spacetime (figure 3.1) is far easier to work with than Reissner-Nordstro¨m (figure 3.2)
in large part because one ignores electric charge, and there is a natural sense in which one can
think of Schwarzschild spacetime as the limit of Reissner-Nordstro¨m as the electric charge of the
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Figure 3.1: Carter-Penrose diagram of Schwarzschild spacetime. Each point in the diagram repre-
sents a 2-sphere in the spacetime manifold. (This diagram is taken from Geroch 1969.)
central black hole decreases in magnitude to zero.15 Contrarily, as a general rule the more degrees
of freedom one includes in a system’s model, the more phenomena that the system manifests
the model can represent, and with greater accuracy (or at least fineness of detail). A generic
representation of such a limiting process can provide a schema of both of these theoretical tools
respectively, depending on whether one enlarges or shrinks the number of degrees of freedom in
the limiting process. As we will see, what in the idealized model one may reasonably identify and
attribute existence to may depend in sensitive ways on the character of the more complex or simpler
models one starts from and the nature of the limiting process itself. This fact drives the argument
I propose. I will first discuss in some detail two examples of such a limiting process in order to
motivate the two precise criteria I propose for the existence of spacetime points independent of
metrical structure.
Before diving into the examples, however, I first characterize in the abstract the limiting process
itself. I use the construction of Geroch (1969) (whose exposition I closely follow), which I only
sketch, to capture it. (I simplify his construction in non-essential ways for our purposes, and gloss
over unnecessary technicalities.) Consider a 1-parameter family of relativistic spacetimes, by which
I mean a family {(Mλ, gab(λ))}λ∈(0,1], where each (Mλ, gab(λ)) is a relativistic spacetime with
signature (+, −, −, −) for gab(λ). (It will be clear in a moment why I work with the contravariant
form of the metric tensor.) In particular, I do not assume that Mλ is diffeomorphic to Mλ′ for
λ 6= λ′. The problem is to find a limit of this family, in some suitable sense, as λ → 0. To solve
the problem in full generality, we will use a geometrical construction, gluing the manifolds Mλ of
the family together to form a 5-dimensional manifold M, so that each Mλ is itself a 4-dimensional
submanifold of M in such a way that the collection of all of them foliate M.16 λ becomes a scalar
15Schwarzschild spacetime is the unique spherically symmetric vacuum solution to the Einstein field equation
(other than Minkowski spacetime); it represents a spacetime that is empty except for an electrically neutral, spher-
ically symmetric, static central body or black hole of a fixed mass. Reissner-Nordstro¨m is the generalization of
Schwarzschild spacetime that allows the central structure to have an electric charge. See, e.g., Hawking and Ellis
(1973, ch.5, §5) for an exposition.
16In general what will result is not a foliation in the strict sense of differential topology, but is close enough to
warrant using the term for simplicity of exposition.
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Figure 3.2: Carter-Penrose diagram of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime. Each point in the diagram
represents a 2-sphere in the spacetime manifold. (This diagram is taken from Geroch 1969.)
field on M, and the metrics gab(λ) on each submanifold fit together to form a tensor field gAB on
M, of signature (0, +, −, −, −). (I use majuscule indices for objects on M.) The gradient of λ on
M determines the singular part of gAB : gAN∇Nλ = 0. (This is why I work with the contravariant
form of the metric; otherwise, we could not contravect its five-dimensional parent in any natural
way with the gradient of λ.) Note that gAB by itself already determines the submanifolds Mλ
(viz., as the surfaces defined by gAN∇Nλ = 0), and that it does so in a way that does not fix any
identification of points among them. In other words, the structure I posit does not allow one to
say that a point in Mλ is “the same point in spacetime” as a point in a different Mλ′ (as I shall
discuss at some length below).
To define a limit of the family now reduces to the problem of the attachment of a suitable
boundary to M “at λ = 0”. A limiting envelopment for M, then, is an ordered quadruplet
(Mˆ, gˆAB , λˆ, Ψ), where Mˆ is a 5-dimensional manifold with paracompact, Hausdorff, connected
and non-trivial boundary ∂Mˆ, gˆAB a tensor field on Mˆ, λˆ a scalar field on Mˆ taking values in
[0, 1], and Ψ a diffeomorphism of M to the interior of Mˆ, all such that
1. Ψ takes gAB to gˆAB (i.e., Ψ is an isometry) and takes λ to λˆ
2. ∂Mˆ is the region defined by λˆ = 0
3. gˆAB has signature (0, +, −, −, −) on ∂Mˆ
This makes precise the sense in which Mˆ represents M with a boundary attached in such a way
that the metric on the boundary (gˆAB restricted to ∂Mˆ) can be naturally identified as a limit
of the metrics on the Mλ (g
AB on M). I call {(Mλ, gab(λ))}λ∈(0,1] an ancestral family of the
spacetime represented by ∂Mˆ, and I call ∂Mˆ the limit space of the family with respect to the given
envelopment. In general, a given spacetime will have many ancestral families, and an ancestral
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family will have many different limit spaces. For the sake of convenience I will often not distinguish
between M and the interior of Mˆ. (Although it is tempting also to abbreviate ‘∂Mˆ’ by ‘M0’, I will
not do so, because part of the point of the construction is that different spacetimes can have the
same ancestral family.)
Before giving an example of the construction and putting it to work, I discuss one of its features,
that it parametrizes not only the metrics but also the spacetime manifolds themselves. Geroch
(1969, p. 181) himself states in illuminating terms the reason behind this.
It might be asked at this point why we do not simply take the gab(λ) as a 1-parameter
family of metrics on a given fixed manifold M. Such a formulation would certainly
simplify the problem: it amounts to a specification of when two points pλ ∈ Mλ′ and
pλ′ ∈Mλ (λ 6= λ′) are to be considered as representing “the same point” ofM. It is not
appropriate to provide this additional information, for it always involves singling out a
particular limit, while we are interested in the general problem of finding all limits and
studying their properties.
To make the force of these remarks clear, consider the attempt to take the limit of Schwarzschild
spacetime as the central mass goes to 0. In Schwarzschild coordinates, using the parameter λ ≡
M−1/3 (the inverse-third root of the Schwarzschild mass), the metric takes the form(
1− 2
λ3r
)
dt2 −
(
1− 2
λ3r
)−1
dr2 − r2(dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2) (3.1)
This clearly has no well defined limit as λ→ 0. Now, apply the coordinate transformation
r˜ ≡ λr, t˜ ≡ λ−1t, ρ˜ ≡ λ−1θ
In these coordinates, the metric takes the form(
λ2 − 2
r˜
)
dt˜2 −
(
λ2 − 2
r˜
)−1
dr˜2 − r˜2(dρ˜2 + λ−2 sin2(λρ˜)dφ2)
The limit λ→ 0 exists and yields
−2
r˜
dt˜2 +
r˜
2
dr˜2 − r˜2(dρ˜2 + ρ˜2dφ2)
a flat solution discovered by Kasner (1921). If instead of that coordinate transformation we apply
the following to the original Schwarzschild form (3.1),
x ≡ r + λ−4, ρ ≡ λ−4θ
then the resulting form also has a well defined limit, which is the Minkowski metric. The two
limiting processes yield different spacetimes because it happens behind the scenes that “the same
points of the underlying manifold get pushed around relative to each other in different ways”.
Because the coordinate relations of initially nearby points differ in different coordinate systems,
those differences get magnified in the limit, so that their final metrical relations differ. Thus, the
limits in the different coordinates yield different metrics.
In the language I introduced above, we should say that the difference between the two limits
consists in the different identifications each makes among the points of different Mλ. That is why
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it is inappropriate to work with a fixed manifold from the start. To do so determines a unique
limit, but we want to allow ourselves different ways to take the limit, so that our ideal scientist
can ignore different facets of the complex system under study, and so produce different idealized
models of it.17 For example, she may want to take the limit of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime as
the mass goes to zero while leaving the electric charge fixed rather than taking the limit as the
electric charge vanishes, or she may want to take the limit in a way that does not respect the
spherical symmetry of the initial system in order, e.g., to study small perturbations of the original
system.
To characterize the metrical structure of the limit space using structure of members of the
ancestral family, I introduce one more construction. An orthonormal tetrad ξ(λ) at a point pλ ∈Mλ
is a collection of 4 tangent vectors at the point mutually orthogonal with respect to gab(λ). Let
γ be a smooth curve on M nowhere tangent to any Mλ such that it intersects each exactly once.
γ then is composed of a set of points pλ ∈ Mλ, one for each λ. A family of frames along γ is a
family of orthonormal tetrads, one at each point of the curve such that each vector in the tetrad
is tangent to its associated Mλ, whose members vary smoothly along it. In general, a family of
frames will have no well defined limit in Mˆ as λ → 0, i.e., there will be no tetrad ξ(0) at a point
of ∂Mˆ that the family ξ(λ) converges to; in this case, I say the family is degenerate. It is always
possible, however, given a tetrad ξ(0) at a point on the boundary to find some family of frames
that does converge to it.
Now, fix ξ(0) at p0 ∈ ∂Mˆ and a family of frames ξ(λ) that converges to it. We can represent the
metric tensor gab(λ) in a normal neighborhood of pλ inMλ using the normal coordinate system that
ξ(λ) defines in the neighborhood. The components of the metric with respect to these coordinates
converge as λ→ 0, and the limiting numbers are just the components of gab(0) at p0 with respect
to the normal coordinates that ξ(0) defines. In this way, we can characterize all structure on the
limit space based on the behavior of the corresponding structures along the family of frames in the
ancestral family.
We are finally in a position to use this machinery to costruct concrete examples. Consider a
family {(Mλ, gab(λ))} of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes each element of the family having the
same fixed value M for its mass and all parametrized by their respective electric charges λ, which
converge smoothly to 0.18 Construct their envelopment. One can now impose a natural collection
of families of frames on the family, with the limit space being Schwarzschild spacetime.19 Now,
comparison of figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggests that something drastic happens in the limit. All the
points in the throat of the Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes (the shaded region in the diagram) seem
to get swallowed by the central singularity in Schwarzschild spacetime—in some way or other, they
vanish. Using our machinery we can make precise the question of their behavior in the limit λ→ 0
17Of course, sometimes is is appropriate for the scientist to take the limit of a family of metrics on a fixed
background manifold. An excellent example is in the statement and proof of the geodesic theorem of Ehlers and
Geroch (2004). In fact, they give an illuminating discussion of this very issue on p. 233.
18I ignore the fact that electric charge is a discrete quantity in the real world, an appropriate idealization in this
context.
19The frames are natural in the sense that they conform to and respect the spherical and the timelike symmetries
in all the spacetimes. One could use this fact to explicate the claim that Schwarzschild spacetime is the canonical
limit of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime, in the sense that it is what one expects on physical grounds, whatever
exactly that may come to, in the limit of vanishing charge while leaving all else about the spacetime fixed.
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in the envelopment.
Consider the points in the shaded region in figure 3.2, between the lines r = 0 and r = r−. (r is
the radial coordinate in a system that respects the spacetime’s spherical symmetry; the coordinate
values r− and r+ define boundaries of physical significance in the spacetime, which in large part
serve to characterize the central region of the spacetime as a black hole.) Fix a natural family of
frames along a curve in M composed of points qλ each of which lies in the shaded region in its
respective spacetime. It is straightforward to verify that the family of frames along the curve does
not have a well defined limit: roughly speaking, the curve runs into the Schwarzschild singularity at
r = 0. In this sense, no point in Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime to the future of the horizon r = r−
has a corresponding point in the limit space. To sum up: one begins with a family of Reissner-
Nordstro¨m spacetimes continuously parametrized by electric charge, which converges to 0, and
constructs the envelopment of the family; one constructs the limit space by a choice of families
of frames; the collection of families of frames enforces an identification of points among different
members of the family of spacetimes, including a division of those points that have a limit from
those that do not; and that identification, in turn, dictates the identification of spacetime points
in the limit space (which points in the ancestral family lie within the Schwarzschild radius, e.g.,
and which do not). Thus one can identify points within the limit Schwarzschild spacetime, one’s
idealized model, only by reference to the metrical structure of members of the ancestral family; one
can, moreover, identify points in the limit space with points in the more complex, initial models
one is idealizing only by reference to the metrical structure of the members of the ancestral family
as well. It is only by the latter identification, however, that one can construe the limit space as
an idealized model of one’s initial models, for the whole point is to simplify the reckoning of the
physical behavior of systems in particular spatiotemporal regions of one’s initial models, and most
of all at individual spacetime points of one’s initial models.
One can, moreover, use different families of natural frames to construct Schwarzschild spacetime
from the same ancestral family, with the result that in each case the same point of Schwarzschild
spacetime is identified with a different family of points in the ancestral family. More generally,
different families of frames will yield limit spaces different from Schwarzschild spacetime, with
no canonical way to identify a point in one limit space (one idealized model the theoretician
constructs) with one in another. In other words, the identification of points in the limit space
depends sensitively on the way the limit is taken, i.e., on the way the model is constructed. In
consequence, in so far as one conceives of Schwarzschild spacetime as an idealized model of a
richer, more complete representation, one can identify points in it only by reference to the metrical
structure of one of its ancestral families, and one can do that in a variety of ways.
Now, say one wants to treat slightly aspherical, almost Schwarzschildian spacetimes as a com-
plexification of Minkowski spacetime, in order to study how asphericities affect metrical behav-
ior.20 Because the limit spacetime will be almost Schwarzschildian, its appropriate manifold is
still R2 × S2, the natural topology of Schwarzschild spacetime. In this case, in one intuitive sense
points will “appear”, because the topology of Minkowski spacetime is R4, so in some sense one
20One ought not confuse the idea of complexification I employ here—the making of a model more complex by
the introduction of new representational structure—with the idea bandied about in other contexts in mathematical
physics often also called ‘complexification’, in which one takes a mathematical structure based on the real numbers
and extends it to one based on the complex numbers.
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must “compactify two topological dimensions” to derive a Schwarzschildian spacetime as a more
complex limit. There are many ways to effect such a compactification; all the simplest, such as
Alexandrov compactification, work by the addition of an extra point or set of points to the topolog-
ical manifold to represent, intuitively speaking, the bringing in of points at infinity to a manageable
distance from everything else.21 The difficulty of these issues, however, is underscored by the fact
that one can also think of this as a case in which points rather disappear : R2 × S2, after all, is
homeomorphic to R4 with a line removed! Thus one could use an ancestral family every member
of which is R4 but that has as limit space the manifold of Schwarzschild spacetime presented as
the manifold R4 with a line removed.22
In this example, we will consider the attempt to introduce a central, slightly aspherical body by
physical construction in a Minkowskian laboratory, as an experimentalist might do it. For the sake
of concreteness, let us say that our experimentalist will, in his representation of the experiment,
use an Alexandrov compactification of R4 to yield R2 × S2 as the presentation of the manifold of
the limit space. The physical construction will proceed in infinitesimal stages, with a tiny portion
of matter introduced at each step distributed in a slightly aspherical way (keeping, in an intuitive
sense, the aspherical shape of the body the same), and an allowance of a finite time to allow
the ambient metrical structure to settle down to an almost Schwarzschildian character before the
next step is initiated, until the central body’s mass reaches the desired amount. (Intuitively, the
finite time period allows the perturbations introduced by the movement of the matter in and its
distribution around the central body to radiate off to infinity.) One can represent this process
with a limiting ancestral family of Geroch’s type in a more or less obvious way, starting with
Minkowski spacetime, viz., the empty, flat laboratory, and each member of the ancestral family
representing the laboratory at a particular stage of the construction, when a bit more matter has
been introduced and the perturbations have settled down.
Now, consider at the beginning of the process a small patch of space in the laboratory not too
far from the position where the central body will be constructed. We want to try to track, as it
were, the spacetime points in that patch during the enlargement of the central body because we
plan to investigate, say, how the metrical structure in regions at that spatiotemporal remove from a
central aspherical body differ from each other for different masses of the central body. (Because the
Einstein field equation is nonlinear, and there is no exact symmetry, one cannot just assume that
slightly aspherical spacetimes will scale in any straightforward way with increases in the central
mass.) There are several ways one might go about trying to track the region as the construction
progresses. One obvious, simple way is by the triangulation of distances from some “fixed” markers
in the laboratory. Because the metrical structure within the lab is constantly changing, however,
and doing so in very complex ways during the periods when new matter is being introduced and
distributed, and the concomitant metrical perturbations are radiating away, there is no canonical
way of implementing the triangulation procedures; in fact, the different ways of doing so are exactly
captured by the different families of frames one can fix to identify points among the members
of the ancestral family of spacetimes (which in this case, recall, now respectively represent the
21See, e.g., Kelley (1955) for an account of methods of compactification, including the Alexandrov type.
22This is a concrete instance where thinking of two different diffeomorphic presentations of the same manifold—in
this case, R2 × S2 and R4 with a line removed—as different manifolds leads to obvious difficulties, if not downright
confusions.
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spacetime region enclosed by the laboratory at different stages of the construction of the central
body). According to some of the concrete implementations of the triangulation procedure, i.e.,
according to different families of frames one uses to identify points among the several members of
the ancestral family, the patch one tries to track will end up inside the central body; according to
other procedures, it will end up outside the central body. In consequence, what one means by “the
set of spacetime points composing a small region at a fixed spatiotemporal position relative to the
central body” will depend sensitively on how one fixes and tracks relative spatiotemporal positions,
which is to say, depends sensitively on one’s knowledge of the spacetime’s metrical structure.23
We are finally in a position to offer a precise criterion for “existence of spacetime points in-
dependent of metrical structure” natural to the investigative contexts we have considered. There
are in fact two natural criteria that suggest themselves, one weaker than the other. The first,
suggested by the example of complexification and stated somewhat loosely, is
Definition 3.1 Points in a spacetime manifold have existence independent of metrical structure
if there is a canonical method to identify spacetime points during gradual modifications to the local
spacetime structure.
My discussion of the example of complexification shows that, in this context and using this criterion,
spacetime points do not have existence independent of metrical structure.
Now, based on the discussion of simplification, I propose a second criterion, stronger than the
first and formulated more precisely and rigorously. Fix an envelopment of a limiting family with
a definite limit space. I say that a point in M1 with an associated degenerate family of frames
vanishes (or that the point itself is a vanishing point) with respect to the given family of frames.
I say that a point in ∂Mˆ appears if there is no family of frames that converges to it.
Definition 3.2 Points in a spacetime manifold have existence independent of metrical structure
if no specification of a family of frames in any ancestral family of the spacetime has vanishing or
appearing points.
I do not demand that one be able to identify in a preferred way a spacetime point in the limit with
any point of any member of one of its ancestral families, much less for all its ancestral families; this
allows us to hold on to diffeomorphic freedom in the presentation of the limit space. I do not even
demand that the criterion hold for every possible spacetime model—perhaps in some spacetimes it
makes sense to attribute existence to spacetime points independent of metrical structure, whereas
in others (say, completely homogeneous spacetimes) it does not. I demand only that, for a given
spacetime, one not be able to make points in any of its ancestral families vanish and not be able
to make points in it, as the limit space, appear. This attempts to capture the idea that, when
23One might object that, in this example, the experimentalist is really trying to track “the same points through
space over time”, not “the same spatiotemporal points in different spacetimes”. In fact, though, since the goal of the
investigation is to determine how global metrical structure in slightly aspherical spacetimes differ for different values
of the central mass, it is natural for the experimentalist to consider each static phase of the laboratory—the period
after the last bit of mass has been added and the perturbations have settled down, but before the next bit of mass
is added—as a separate spacetime in its own right, for the purposes of comparison. An appropriate analogue is the
so-called “physical process” version of the First Law of black-hole mechanics Wald and Gao 2001; Wald 1994, where
one must identify two separate spacetimes (in the sense of two different solutions to the Einstein field equation) that
differ in that one conceives of the one as the result of a dynamical evolution of the other, even though there is no
concrete representation of that evolution as occurring in a single spacetime.
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we construct a spacetime model and treat it as an idealized representation of a more complex
system—as it always is—then we can reliably identify spacetime points in our model with points in
the more complex system, albeit up to diffeomorphic presentation. If we cannot do this irrespective
of the more complex model we start from, then we cannot without arbitrariness and artifice regard
results of an investigation in the context of the idealized model as relevant to the physics of the
more complex system, for we will be unable to identify the regions in the more complex system that
the results of the idealizing investigation pertain to. The example of Schwarzschild spacetime as a
limit of a family of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes clearly does not satisfy the criterion, for there
are points that vanish in the limiting procedure (e.g., those in the shaded region of figure 3.2). One
may suspect that the existence of singular structure in the two spacetimes fouls things up. The
following result, however, establishes in a strong sense that no spacetime satisfies the criterion, i.e.,
that its failure is universal and depends on no special properties of any spacetime model.
Every spacetime has at least one ancestral family, the trivial one consisting of the continuous
sequence of itself, so to speak. Construct an envelopment M for it, with it itself as the limit space,
and apply a slight twist, so to speak, to every metric in every model in the family so as to render
each model non-isometric to any other, i.e., so as to render the family non-trivial. (One can make
this idea precise in any of a number of simple ways.) On a curve in M, fix a family of frames that
has a well defined limit on ∂Mˆ. Now, define a family of Lorentz transformations along that curve,
one transformation at each point, such that the family varies smoothly along the curve, and such
that when one applies each transformation to the tetrad at its point, the result is a family of frames
that has no well defined limit. (One can always do this; for example, the Lorentz transformations
can cause the tetrads to oscillate wildly as λ → 0.) The points of the ancestral family along that
curve have no corresponding point in the limit space defined by the resulting family of frames.
This proves
Proposition 3.3 Every spacetime has a non-trivial ancestral family with vanishing points. Every
non-trivial ancestral family has a limit space with respect to which some of its points vanish.
In consequence, in every relativistic spacetime we treat as an idealized model in the context of this
sort of scientific investigation, we can attribute existence to individual spacetime points (or not),
only by reference to the metrical structure of the ancestral family we use to construct the model,
and the limiting process we choose for the construction.
An obvious objection to the relevance of these arguments to the ontic status of spacetime
points is that I deal here only with idealizations and approximations, not with “a real model of
real spacetime”. But we never work with anything that is not an idealization—it’s idealizations
all the way down, young man, as part of the human condition. If you can’t show me how to argue
for the existence of spacetime points independently of metrical structure using our best scientific
theories as they are actually used in successful practice, then you are not relying on real science
to ground your arguments. You are paying only lip-service to the idea that science should ground
these sorts of metaphysical issues.
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4 Pointless Constructions
The argument of §3 yields a conclusion that holds only in a limited sphere, viz., those investigations
based on the idealization of models of spacetime by means of limits. One may wonder whether it
could be parlayed into a more general argument. I do not think so. Indeed, I think there is no sound
argument to the effect that no matter the context of the investigation one can identify spacetime
points or attribute existence to them only by reference to prior metrical structure. Sometimes, in
some contexts, one can attribute existence to them and identify them without any such reference.
To show this, I will present an argument that all the structure accruing to a spacetime, considered
simply as a differential manifold that represents the collection of all possible (or, depending on one’s
modal predilections, actual) physical events, can be given definition with clear physical content
in the absence of metrical structure. The argument takes the form of the construction of the
point-manifold of a spacetime, its topology, its differential structure and all tensor bundles over it
from a collection of primitive objects that, when the construction is complete, acquires a natural
interpretation as a family of covering charts from the manifold’s atlas, along with the families
of bounded, continuous scalar fields on the domain of each chart. That idea yields the following
precise criterion the argument will rely on.
Definition 4.1 Points in a spacetime manifold have existence independent of metrical structure if
the manifold can be constructed from a family of scalar fields, the values of which can be empirically
determined without knowledge of metrical structure.
The basic idea of the construction is simple. I posit a class of sets of rational numbers to
represent the possible values of physical fields, with a bit of additional structure in the form of
primitive relations among them just strong enough to ground the definition of a derived relation
whose natural interpretation is “lives at the same point of spacetime as”. A point of spacetime,
then, consists of an equivalence class of the derived relation. The derived relation, moreover, pro-
vides just enough rope to allow for the definition of a topology and a differential structure on the
family of all equivalence classes, and from this the definition of all tensor bundles over the resultant
manifold, completing the construction. The posited primitive and derived relations have a straight-
forward physical interpretation, as the designators of instances of a schematic representation of
a fundamental type of procedure the experimental physicist performs on physical fields when he
attempts to ascertain relations of physical proximity and superposition among their observed val-
ues. An important example of such an experimental procedure is his use of the observed values of
physical quantities associated with experimental apparatus to determine the values of quantities
associated with other systems, those he investigates by use of the apparatus. This interpretation
of the relations motivates the claim that the constructed structure suffices, for our purposes, as
a representation of spacetime in the context of a particular type of experimental investigation as
modeled by mathematical physics, and is not (only) an abstract mathematical toy.
I begin the construction by laying down some definitions. Let Q be the set of rational numbers.
A simple pointless field φ (or just simple field) is a disjoint union
⊎
p∈Q4
fp, indexed by the set Q4,
such that
1. every fp ∈ Q
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2. there is an fp ∈ φ for every p ∈ Q4
3. there are two strictly positive numbers Bl and Bu such that Bl < |fp| < Bu for all p ∈ Q4
4. the function φ¯ : Q4 → Q defined by φ¯(p) = fp is continuous in the natural topologies on
those spaces, except perhaps across a finite number of compact three-dimensional boundaries
in Q4
Our eventual interpretation of such a thing as a candidate result for an experimentalist’s determi-
nation of the values for a physical field motivates the set of conditions. That we index φ over Q4
means that we assume from the start that the experimentalist by the use of actual measurements
and observations alone can impose on spacetime at most the structure of a countable lattice indexed
by quadruplets of rational numbers (and even this only in a highly idealized sense); in other words,
the spatiotemporal precision of measurements is limited. Condition 1 says that all measurements
have only a finite precision in the determination of the field’s value. Condition 2 says that the
field the experimentalist measures has a definite value at every point of spacetime. Condition 3
says that there is an upper and a lower limit to the magnitude of values the experimentalist can
attribute to the field using the proposed experimental apparatus and technique; for instance, any
device for the measurement of the energy of a system has only a finite precision, and thus can
attribute only absolute values greater than a certain magnitude, and the device will be unable to
cope with energies above a given magnitude. Condition 4 tries to capture the ideas that (local)
experiments involve only a finite number of bounded physical systems (apparatuses and objects of
study), and that classical physical systems bear physical quantities the magnitudes of which vary
continously (if not more smoothly), except perhaps across the boundaries of the systems.
Fix a family Φ of simple pointless fields. The link at p, λp, is a set containing exactly one element
from each simple field in Φ such that all the elements are indexed by p, the same quadruplet of
rational numbers. One link, for example, consists of the set of all values in the fields in Φ indexed
by (3/17, 2, −3001 9091 , 2). A linked family of simple pointless fields F is an ordered pair (Φ, Λ)
where Φ is a countable collection of simple fields, and Λ is the family of links on Φ, a linkage,
complete in the sense that it contains exactly one link for each p ∈ Q4. The idea is that the
values of the simple fields in the same link all live “at the same point of spacetime”, namely that
designated by p. One can think of the linkage as a coordinate system on an underlying, abstract
point set.
We are almost ready to define the point-structure of the spacetime manifold. We require only
two more constructions, which I give in an abbreviated fashion so as to convey the main points
without getting bogged down in unnecessary technical detail. Let F = (Φ, Λ) be a linked family
containing all simple fields; we call it a simple fundamental family. Let Fˆ = (Φˆ, Λˆ) be another. We
want a way to relate the linkages of the two, so as to be able to represent the relation between the
coordinate systems of two different charts on the same neighborhood of the spacetime manifold,
or on the intersection of two neighborhoods. A cross-linkage on a simple fundamental family is
an ordered triplet (O, Oˆ, χ) where O ⊆ Q4 and Oˆ ⊆ Q4 are open sets, such that either both
are the null set or else both are homeomorphic to Q4, and χ is a homeomorphism of O to Oˆ.
The link λp ∈ Λ for p ∈ O, then, will designate the same point in the underlying manifold as
λˆχ(p) ∈ Λˆ for χ(p) ∈ Oˆ; in this case, we say the links touch. If O and Oˆ are the null set, then
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the represented neighborhoods do not intersect. (We do not require that the values of the scalar
fields in the two different simple fundamental families be numerically equal at any given point,
as the two scalar fields may represent different physical quantities, e.g., a component of the fluid
velocity and a component of the shear-stress tensor of a viscous fluid.) One can extend the idea
of a cross-linkage to an arbitrary number of simple fundamental families in the obvious way. (To
make the idea precise we would need to index the collection of families, and so on, but I think it is
clear enough without going through the bother.) We would then identify a point in an underlying
abstract point-set as an equivalence class of links under the equivalence relation “touches”.
To finish the preparatory work, we must move from rationals to reals. Fix a simple, fundamental
family F. First, we attribute to F the algebraic structure of a module over Q. For example, the
sum of two simple pointless fields φ and ψ in Φ is a simple pointless field ξ such that xp ≡ fp + gp
is the value in ξ labeled by the index p, where fp ∈ φ and gp ∈ ψ. ξ is clearly itself a simple
pointless field with a natural embedding in the linkage on F, and so belongs to Φ. Now, roughly
speaking, we take a double Cauchy-like completion of Φ over both the points p ∈ Q4 and the
values fpˆ ∈ Q, yielding the family Φ¯ of all disjoint unions of real numbers continuously indexed by
quadruplets of real numbers.24 This procedure makes sense, because every continuous real scalar
field on R4 is, again roughly speaking, the limit of some sequence of bounded, continuous rational
fields defined on Q4. We thus obtain what is in effect the family Φ¯ of all continuous real scalar
fields on R4, though I refer to them as pointless fields, in so far as, at this point, they are still
only indexed disjoint unions. The limiting procedure, moreover, induces on Φ¯ the structure of a
module over R from that on Φ. Finally, in the obvious way, we take the completion, as it were,
of Lambda using the same limiting procedure to obtain a linkage Λ¯ on Φ¯. I call F¯ = (Φ¯, Λ¯) a
fundamental family. A cross-linkage on a pair of fundamental families is the same as for simple
fundamental families, except only that one uses homeomorphisms on subsets of R rather than Q.
If we have two simple fundamental families with a cross-linkage on them and take limits to yield
two fundamental families, then the nature of the limiting process guarantees a unique cross-linkage
on the two fundamental families consistent with the original.
We can at last construct a real topological manifold from a collection of simple fundamental
families. The basic idea is that a fundamental family represents the family of continuous real
functions on the interior of a bounded, normal neighborhood of what will be the spacetime manifold.
Because a spacetime manifold must be paracompact (otherwise it could not bear a Lorentz metric),
there is always a countable collection of such bounded, normal neighborhoods that cover it. This
suggests
Definition 4.2 A pointless topological manifold is an ordered pair ({Fi}i∈N, χ) consisting of a
countable set of simple fundamental families and a cross-linkage on them.
To justify the definition, I sketch the construction of the full point-manifold and its topology. First,
we take the joint limit of all simple fundamental families to yield a countable collection of funda-
mental families with the induced cross-linkage. A point in the manifold, then, is an equivalence
class of links, at most one link from each family, under the equivalence relation “touches”. The
24In order to get the completion we require, standard Cauchy convergence does not in fact suffice. We must rather
use a more general method, such as Moore-Smith convergence based on topological nets. The technical details are
not important. See, e.g., Kelley (1955, ch. 2) for details.
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set of links associated with one of the families, then, becomes a representation, with respect to the
equivalence relation, of the interior of a compact, normal neighborhood in the manifold, and the
fields in that family represent the collection of continous real functions on that neighborhood. The
cross-linkage defines the intersections among all these neighborhoods, yielding the entire point-set
of the manifold. By assumption, the collection of all such neighborhoods forms a sub-basis for
the topology of the manifold, and so, by constructing the unique topological basis from the given
sub-basis, the point-set becomes a true topological manifold. It is straightforward to verify, for
example, that a real scalar field on the constructed manifold is continuous if and only if its restric-
tion to any of the basic neighborhoods defines a field in the fundamental family associated with
that neighborhood.
Now, to complete the construction, we can define the manifold’s differential structure can in a
straightforward way using similar techniques. First, demarcate the family of smooth scalar fields
as a sub-set of the continuous ones, which one can do in any of a number straightforward ways with
clear physical content based on the idea of directional derivatives. The family of all smooth scalar
fields on a topological manifold, however, fixes its differential structure (Chevalley 1947). The
directional derivatives themselves suffice for the definition of the tangent bundle over the manifold,
and from that one obtains all tensor bundles.
After so much abstruse and, worse, tedious technical material, we can now judge whether the
construction supports the argument I want to found on it. The use of Q4 to index a simple
pointless field represents the fact that all points in a laboratory have been uniquely labeled by 4
rational numbers, say, by the use of rulers and stop-watches. Such an operation neither measures
nor relies on knowledge of metrical structure, for it yields in effect only a chart on that spacetime
region. (No assumption need be made about the “metrical goodness” of the rulers and clocks.)
Neither does any other operation used in the construction pertain to metrical structure. One
determines the values of the simple fields, for example, by use of physical observations, which do
not themselves necessarily depend on knowledge of the ambient metrical structure. To illustrate
the idea, consider the use of a gravity gradiometer to measure the components of the Riemann
tensor in a region of spacetime, which exemplifies many of the ideas in the construction. The
gradiometer is essentially a sophisticated torsion balance for measuring the quadrupole moments
(and higher) of an acceleration field.25 Its fixed center and the ends of its two rotatable axes
continuously occupy at any given moment 5 proximate points, the attribution to which of values
for linear and angular acceleration yields direct measures of the components of the Riemann tensor
in a normal frame adapted to the position and motion of the instrument. One then identifies
the spacetime points the parts of the instrument respectively occupy, and by extension those in
the normal frame adapted to it, by the values of the components of the Riemann tensor and
their derivatives in that frame, by the values of its scalar invariants, and so on.26 One does not
have to postulate a prior metric structure in order to perform the measurements and label the
points, nor need one have already determined the metrical structure by experiment. Indeed, in
the performance of the gradiometer measurements one determines much of spacetime’s metrical
structure. Because the facts of intrinsic physical significance that the values of the fields and the
25See, e.g., Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler 1973, §16.5, pp. 401–402, for a description of the device and its use.
26See, for example, Bergmann and Komar (1960), Bergmann and Komar (1962) for a concrete, albeit purely
formal, example of a procedure for implementing this idea.
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relations among them embody (is this body in contact with another? does heat flow from that
body to this or vice-versa?), moreover, remain invariant under the action of a diffeomorphism it
follows that the equivalence classes we used to construct points does so as well. Thus, we can fix all
the manifold structure, including metrical, only up to diffeomorphism, as we expect. This shows
that the construction delivers everything we need and nothing more.
There is an obvious response to the argument based on this construction. One may object that,
so far from the argument’s having shown thatthe construction pushes us to attribute independent
existence to spacetime points, it rather suggests that points are defined only by reference to prior
physical systems, and hence exist in only a Pickwickian sense, dependent on the identifiability of
those physical systems. This objection can be answered by, as it were, throwing away the ladder.
Once one has the identification of spacetime points with equivalence classes of values of scalar
fields, one can as easily say that the points are the objects with primitive ontological significance,
and the physical systems are defined by the values of fields at those points, those values being
attributes of their associated points only per accidens.27 I do not pretend to endorse such a move,
but I do not have to. My constructive argument is ad hominem.
5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists
I do not consider the idea of pointless manifolds deep or of great interest in its own right.28 There
are, I am sure, many other constructions in the same spirit. If one were so inclined, I suppose
one could try to take something like it to give a precise way for a relationalist to characterize
the spacetime manifold.29 I am not so inclined, because I do not think the contemporary debate
between the relationalist and the substantivalist has been well posed, and I am inclined to think
it never will be in any interesting sense. That is what I take to be the force of the opposed
constructions of §3 and §4, taken in tandem. They show that “dependence on prior metrical
structure” is formal, i.e., without substantive content until given explication in the framework of
an investigative enterprise, even if that framework be given only in schematic form. Once one
grants this, however, the game is up. Different investigative frameworks can and do yield natural
criteria that lead to contrary conclusions.30
An amusing and poignant feature of the constructions shows this clearly: each yields a conclu-
sion contrary to what the traditional debates would have led one to have expected based on the
tools and techniques it employs. In the second, one uses independent values of physical quantities
(a stock in trade of the relationalist) in order to identify and attribute existence to spacetime points
27Stachel (1993) provides an elegant tool for describing the result of such a construction as I propose and in
particular this rebuttal to the proposed objection (though I should say his work is not related to a project such
as this). In his terms, I have sketched the construction of an individuating field independent of the stipulation
of metrical structure, viz., a field or system of fields on spacetime that suffices for the identification of individual
spacetime points.
28There are a few questions of potential interest that accrue to it. Is it possible to determine the topology of
a non-compact manifold by the postulation of a finite number of simple fields? If so, does the minimum number
depend on a topological invariant? Is it in any case greater than the number of fields we currently believe to have
physical import?
29See Butterfield (1984) for a survey of some ways one might attempt such a project.
30This line of argument bears fruitful comparison to the ideas of Ruetsche (2011), though it was developed
independently of her work.
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without a prior assumption of metric structure; and in the first, one uses structures in mathemati-
cal physics that seem to presuppose the independent identifiability of spacetime points (a stock in
trade of the substantivalist) in order to argue that in fact they are not identifiable without a prior
postulation of metric structure. One may think that these features of the arguments make them,
in the end, self-defeating, but I do not think that is so. In the first, one operates under the implicit
assumption that the more complex models one idealizes are themselves only idealizations of yet
more complex models. In the second, one implicitly assumes that, say, the gradiometer is small
enough and the temporal interval of the measurement itself short enough to justify the use of the
Minkowski metric in making the initial attributions of the magnitudes of spatiotemporal intervals
in the experiment; one then uses this to bootstrap one’s way to a more accurate representation of
the metrical structure of spacetime, which is what is done in practice. I think that this facet of
the arguments, perhaps more than anything else, illustrates the vanity of the traditional debate:
one can use the characteristic resources and moves of each side to construct arguments contrary
to it, once one takes the trouble to make the question precise.
Most damning in my eyes, the constructions show the futility of the debate, for they make
explicit how very little one gains in comprehension or understanding by having taken the consider-
able trouble to have made the questions precise. Indeed, one may feel with justice that nothing has
been gained, but rather something has been lost in a pettifoggery of irrelevant technical detail.31
Although I conclude the traditional debate is without real content, I think there is a related,
interesting question one can give clear sense to: what in one’s investigative framework is naturally
taken to, or must one take to, have intrinsic physical significance? Even putting aside existence and
ontology as emotive distractions, however, I do not think one can give even this question substantive
sense in the abstract: the question is a formal template that one must give substance to by fixing
the significance of its terms in presumably different ways in different particular contexts.
Consider one way to rephrase the question that may seem on its face to give it concrete content
in abstraction from any schematic framework: what propositions would all observers agree on? One
cannot answer this question in the abstract, or even give it definite sense, because one has not yet
fixed the way that one will schematically represent the observer (or experimental apparatus) and
the process of observation. In order to do so, one must settle many questions of a more concrete
nature. Will one use the same theory to model the observation as one uses to model the system?
Will one take the observer to be a test system, in the sense that the values of its associated physical
quantities do not contribute to the initial-value formulation of the equations of motion of one’s
theoretical or experimental models? And so on. Until one settles such issues, one cannot even say
with precision what any single observer can or will observe, much more what all will agree on. In
this sense, even claims such as “in general relativity, only what is invariant under diffeomorphisms
has intrinsic physical significance” have only schematic content. One must give definite substance
to the “what” in “what is invariant”—substance that involves the forms of the physical systems
at issue and the methods available for their probing and representation—before one can make the
claim play any definite role in our attempts to comprehend the world. I take this to be the lesson
of Stein (1977), viz., that the way to proceed in these matters is the one Newton and Riemann
relied on: we must infer what we can about the spatiotemporal structure of the world from the
31Jeremy Butterfield in particular has vigorously tried to convince me that I dismiss too readily the possible
philosophical value of the technical constructions and arguments of §§3 and 4. I would like to think he is right.
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roles it plays in characterizing physical interactions; and on this basis, neither substantivalism nor
relationalism can claim any great victory.32
In the end, why should we ever have expected there to have been a single, canonical way to
explicate the physical significance of the idea of a spacetime point, on the basis of which we might
then attempt to determine whether such a thing exists or not in some lofty or mundane sense?
What, after all, is lost to our comprehension of the physical world without such a unique, canonical
explication? We purport after all, in these debates, to attempt to better comprehend the physical
world. Hadn’t we better ensure, then, that the terms of our arguments have the capacity to come
in some important way into contact with the physical world by way of experiment and theory?
Once we take that demand seriously, we find an orgiastic crowd of possible candidates to serve as
concrete realizations of the question, some of which will be fruitful in some kinds of enterprises,
others in others, and, most likely, several in none at all. Indeed, I am far from convinced that
the question of the existence of spacetime points has ever itself been well posed. What possible
difference could an answer to it make one way or another to the proper comprehension of the
performance of an experiment or the proper construction of a model of a physical system in the
context of general relativity?
I think there is a better question at hand: what mathematical structures “best” represent our
experience of spatiotemporal localization? Again, this question cannot be answered in the abstract,
for it depends sensitively on the answers to other, more or less independent and yet inextricable
questions, such as: what mathematical structures best represent our experience of other features
of spatiotemporal phenomena, such as the lack of absolute simultaneity, the orientability of space,
etc.? And also questions such as: what structures for representation of various kinds of derivatives
do we need to formulate equations of motion? And what structures for representation of Maxwell
fields? And so on. One has to attempt to address these questions in a dialectical fashion, answering
part of one here, seeing what adjustments that requires in other parts of the manifold of possible
structures, so to speak, and so on. The answer to one of these questions in one context may be
individual points of a spacetime manifold, to another question in another context it may be area
and volume operators as in loop quantum gravity, and so on. It is to the investigation of such
questions that I now turn.
6 An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures
The arguments of this paper extend themselves naturally beyond the realm of the debate over
the existence of spacetime points, and do so in a way that sheds further light on the futility of
that debate. There are many different senses one can give to the question whether some putative
entity or structure of any type has real physical significance in the context of general relativity,
32DiSalle (1994, p. 274) trenchantly makes a very closely related point, one, indeed, that in large part may be
viewed as foundational for my analysis:
Since the work of Riemann and Helmholtz, however (not to mention Einstein), it should be clear that
our claims about ‘objective’ spatiotemporal relations always involve assumptions about the physical
processes we use for measurement and stipulations about how those processes are to indicate aspects
of geometry.
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each more or less natural in different contexts. For lack of a better term, I shall say that an entity
(which, as we shall see, can encompass several different types of thing), purportedly represented
by a theoretical structure, has physicality if one has a reason to take that structure seriously in
a physical sense, viz., if one can show that it plays an ineliminable role in the way that theory
makes contact with experiment. Of course, as I stressed in §2, such an abstract, purely formal
schema as “plays an ineliminable role in the way that theory makes contact with experiment” has
no real content until one explicates it in the context of a more or less well delineated investigative
framework. It is the examples that give the idea life.
6.1 Manifest Physicality
A Maxwell field, represented by the Faraday tensor Fab, is manifestly physical. One important
sense in which this is true turns on the fact that it contributes to the stress-energy tensor on the
righthand side of the Einstein field equation. The Maxwell field itself possesses stress-energy, and
in general relativity nothing is physical if not that.
Consider now a Killing field on spacetime, a vector field ξa that satisfies Killing’s equation
∇(a ξb) = 0 (6.1)
and so generates an isometry, in the sense that £ξ gab = 0. In this guise, it seems not to possess
the characteristics of a physical field, in so far as it enters the equations of motion of no manifestly
physical system, such as a Maxwell field. In other words, it does not couple with phenomena we
consider physical, does not contribute to the stress-energy tensor. Now, define the 2-index covariant
tensor Pab ≡ ∇a ξb. Equation (6.1) implies that it is anti-symmetric. Let us say that it happens
as well to have vanishing divergence and curl, ∇nPna = 0 and ∇[aPbc] = 0, and so satisfies the
source-free Maxwell equations. Is it eo ipso a true Maxwell field, and so physical? Not necessarily.
There are always an innumerable number of 2-forms on a spacetime that satisfy the source-free
Maxwell equations. At most, one of them represents a physical Maxwell field. If, however, it just
so happened that Pab were to represent the physical Maxwell field on spacetime—one known as
a Papapetrou field in this case—the fact that one natural way to represent the field happened to
generate an isometry would appear to be an accident, in the sense that no property of the field
accruing to it by dint of its physicality, which is to say, by dint of its satisfaction of the Maxwell
equations and concomitant coupling with other manifestly physical phenomena (such as spacetime
curvature, by way of the Einstein field equation), depends on the satisfaction of equation (6.1)
by ξa (except in the trivial sense that satisfaction of equation (6.1) is necessary for ξa to be a
4-vector potential for a Maxwell field). Still, ξa is a naturally distinguished geometrical structure
in the physical description of spacetime, forms a part of the description of spacetime independent
of the particulars of the physical constitution of any observed phenomena, in particular in so far
as it places non-trivial contraints on a manifestly physical structure, the spacetime metric. In this
sense, different from that pertaining to the Maxwell field, ξa is physical, for the Maxwell field, by
contrast, is not naturally distinguished in this sense, but rather depends in an essential way on the
peculiar physical constitution of a particular family of phenomena.
In what sense, though, is the metric manifestly physical? The metric does not itself contribute
to the stress-energy content of spacetime, for one cannot attribute a localized gravitational stress-
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energy to it.33 That is not to say that the metric does not appear in the stress-energy tensor
of a given spacetime, for it is almost always required for the construction of the stress-energy
tensor.34 The stress-energy tensor of a Maxwell field, for example, is FanF
n
b +
1
4gabFrsF
rs. (The
metric appears not only explicitly in the second term, but also implicitly in both terms, raising the
contracted indices.) The metric, however, is necessary both for posing the initial-value formulation
of every possible kind of field that may appear in a relativistic spacetime, in particular all of those
(such as the Maxwell field) that we regard as manifestly physical, and for formulating the equations
of motion of the fields. In particular, the metric dynamically couples with other physical systems,
i.e., enters into interaction with them in the strong sense that there always exist terms in the
equations of motion for any given field in which the metric appears as one factor and the tensor
representation of the field as another. For the Maxwell field, the metric appears contravected with
the Faraday tensor in the equation of motion representing the fact that its covariant divergence
equals the charge-current density of matter.35
The metric, of course, can play other roles as well, just as a Killing field. A vacuum spacetime
with non-zero cosmological constant has a stress-energy tensor equal to the metric times a constant.
In this case, one plausible way of reading the Einstein field equation is to have the metric play
simultaneously two distinct roles, one as the necessary ground of all spatiotemporal structure
(embodied in the Einstein tensor) and the other as a component in the tensor representing the
stress-energy content of spacetime, depending on contingent features of the ambient matter field,
in this case, whatever field gives rise to the cosmological constant. Again, in the former sense,
as ground of spatiotemporal structure, the metric is a naturally distinguished structure in any
physical description of spacetime; in the latter sense, it rather depends on the peculiar, contingent
physical constitution of a particular family of phenomena.
Consider the Riemann tensor. Again, it manifests physicality in several different ways, in
different contexts. Perhaps the most important is in the equation of geodesic deviation, where it
directly measures the rate at which infinitesimally neighboring geodesics tend to converge towards
or diverge away from each other. In this case, the Riemann tensor’s physicality consists in the fact
that it encodes all information needed to model manifestly observable phenomena, viz., the relative
acceleration of nearby freely falling particles and the tidal force exerted between different parts of a
freely falling extended body. Another important role it plays in general relativity is as the measure
of the failure of the ambient covariant derivative operator associated with the spacetime metric
to commute with itself when acting on vectors or tensors. Here, the physical interpretation is not
clear, but one way of trying to explicate it is by considering the way that a tangent vector changes
when parallel-propagated around an “infinitesimally small” loop.36 The infinitesimal change in the
vector when it returns to the initial point is directly proportional to the Riemann tensor. Still, it
is difficult to say that this has real physical significance, in so far as one could implement such a
33See, e.g., Curiel (2014a).
34Indeed, the only example I know of a stress-energy tensor for which the metric is not needed for its definition
is the case of a null gas, for which only the conformal structure of spacetime is required.
35That the other defining equation for a Maxwell field, representing the fact that the Faraday tensor is curl-
free, does not require the metric at all for its formulation—the exterior derivative is determined by the differential
structure of the underlying manifold, and does not require any other structure at all for its definition—may push
one to say that it is not a dynamical equation of motion, but rather a kinematical constraint.
36See Wald (1984, ch. 2, §3) for a thorough exposition.
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mechanism and measure the result only in a spacetime with closed causal curves. And yet so much
of the mathematical apparatus of general relativity depends on the fact that the ambient derivative
operator is, in general, not flat (i.e., fails to commute with itself), that it would be absurd to say
that the Riemann tensor is not playing a physical role here. What exactly that role is, however, is
not easy to pin down.
The Einstein tensor itself presents an interesting case. It has no straightforward geometrical
interpretation.37 It seems, moreover, to have no straightforward physical interpretation either—it
enters into the equations of motion of no known fields; it measures no quantitative feature of any
known physical phenomena; it does not represent a field possessing stress-energy; it constrains the
behavior of no other manifestly physical structure; and so on. And yet it is the structure that
matter fields couple to (via the Einstein field equation) in their role as source for spatiotemporal
curvature. In this role, it dynamically couples with no individual matter fields, but rather only
to the aggregate physical quantity “stress-energy” they all possess, and which, according to the
fundamental principle of the fungibility of all forms of energy,38 in no way differs qualitatively
among all known fields. Again, then, it seems manifestly physical in some sense, but it is difficult
to put one’s finger clearly on that sense.
Global structures of various sorts (causal, topological, projective, conformal, affine, et al.)
present interesting cases as well.39 Consider the conformal structure of a spacetime. It governs
and is embodied in the relative behavior of the null cones across all spacetime points. One natural
interpretation of the null cones is as determining a finite, unachievable upper-limit for the velocities
of material systems.40 The fact that the null cones determine a topological boundary for the
chronological future and past of every spacetime point also has a natural interpretation in the
same vein: if the chronological future or past were topologically closed, then there would be a
limiting upper velocity for massive bodies that would be actually achievable by a massive body
using only a finite amount of energy. If one accepts these interpretative glosses, then the conformal
structure has physicality in so far as it constrains the behavior of manifestly physical systems.
So, to sum up the notions of physicality mooted here are:
• contributes to Tab (e.g., Maxwell field)
• required for initial-value formulation of manifestly physical fields (e.g., Maxwell field, gab)
• dynamically couples to manifestly physical entities (e.g., Maxwell field, gab)
• dynamically couples to manifestly physical quantities that more than one type of physical
system can bear (e.g., Einstein tensor)
37See Curiel (2014b) for a discussion.
38See Maxwell (1877, ch. v, §97) and Maxwell (1888, chs. i, iii, iv, viii, xii) for illuminating discussion of this
principle.
39I take a structure to be global if it is not local in the sense explicated by Manchak (2009, p. 55):
[A] condition C on a spacetime is local if, given any two locally isometric spacetimes (M, gab) and
(M ′, g′ab), (M, gab) satisfies C if and only if (M
′, g′ab) satisfies C.
I think Manchak’s definition of “local” is superior, as judged by its physical significance in the context of general
relativity, to the one I proposed in Curiel (1999, §5), though the latter may still be of interest in purely mathematical
contexts, or in contexts of physical investigation that transcend the scope of a single theory.
40See, however, Geroch (2010) and Earman (2013) for dissenting arguments.
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• acts as a measure of an observable aspect of manifestly physical entities (e.g., Riemann
tensor)
• enters the field equation of a manifestly physical structure (e.g., Einstein tensor)
• constrains the behavior of a manifestly physical entity (e.g., Killing field, conformal structure)
• plays an ineliminable, though physically obscure, role in the mathematical structure required
to formulate the theory (e.g., Riemann tensor, Einstein tensor)
I am confident there are yet more senses of physicality I have not touched upon.
6.2 Observability
One does not have to be an instrumentalist or an empiricist to accept that the possible observabil-
ity of physical phenomena is one of the most fundamental reasons we have to think such things are
physical in the first place. The question of the observability of various kinds of global structure in
general relativity, therefore, poses particularly interesting problems for arguments about physical-
ity. Manchak (2009), Manchak (2011) shows that, in a precise sense, local observations can never
suffice to determine the complete global structure of spacetime in general, and in particular cannot
determine whether a spacetime is inextendible or stably causal (Manchak 2011, p. 418, proposi-
tion 3). Nonetheless, there remain several things to say and ask about the matter of physicality
here.
Take, for example, the Euler number of the spacetime manifold, a global topological structure.41
It is a topological invariant that, in part, constrains the possible existence of everywhere non-zero
vector fields on a manifold. That an even-dimensional sphere, for example, possesses no everywhere
non-zero vector field (and indeed no Lorentzian metric) follows directly from the computation of
its Euler number. If we were to live in a world whose underlying manifold possessed a non-trivial
Euler number, and so could support no physical process that would manifest itself as an everywhere
non-zero vector field, this would constitute a physical fact about the world in an indubitable sense.
It is not clear to me, however, whether in some precise sense the Euler number of the spacetime
manifold could ever be determined by direct observation.
The orientability of spacetime is an example of a global topological structure that seems to be
strictly inobservable in an intuitive sense. This follows from the fact that one can construct an
orientable manifold from any non-orientable one by lifting the structures on it to a suitable covering
space, which is automatically orientable. The lift of the spacetime metric to a covering manifold,
however, would yield a representation of exactly the same physical spacetime as the original: every
physical phenomena in the one has an isometric analogue, as it were, in the other, and vice-versa.
Whether or not a spacetime manifold is simply connected, moreover, seems to be in the same boat,
for the universal covering manifold of a manifold is guaranteed to be simply connected.42
41See, e.g., Alexandrov (1957, ch. viii).
42In order for a manifold to possess a universal covering manifold, it must be semi-locally simply connected.
Intuitively, this means that it cannot contain “arbitrarily small holes”. More precisely, it means that every point in
the space has a neighborhood such that every loop in the neighborhood can be continuously contracted to a point.
(The contraction need not occur entirely with the given neighborhood.) The so-called Hawaiian Ear-Ring is an
example of a topological space that is not semi-locally simply connected (Biss 2000). Whether or not a spacetime
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Nonetheless, I think those answers about the possible observability of a manifold’s orientability
and simple connectedness may be too pat. If one were to observe that any member of a certain
family of closed, physically distinguished spatiotemporal loops could not be continuously deformed
into any member of another family of closed, physically distinguished spatiotemporal loops, one
would have shown that the spacetime manifold is not simply connected.43 Similarly, if one could
show that to parallely propagate a fixed orthonormal tetrad around a given closed spatiotemporal
loop would result in its inversion, one would have demonstrated that spacetime is not orientable.
I personally have no idea what sorts of experiment could show either of those things. The history
of physics, however, if it shows us nothing else, does show us never to underestimate the ingenuity
of experimentalists, no matter what the theoretician may tell them is impossible to observe or
measure.
The first Betti number of the spacetime manifold offers another interesting example of this sort.
The first Betti number of a topological space is the number of distinct connected components it
has; any manifold with a first Betti number greater than one is ipso facto not connected. Say that
we posited a non-connected spacetime manifold. According to the principles of general relativity,
any phenomena in one component would be strictly inobservable in any other.44 By this criterion,
it makes no sense to attribute physicality to regions of spacetime disconnected from our own.
So, are these possibly inobservable global structures physical? Well, it seems to me that in one
sense they are, and in others they are not. The only lesson I want to draw here is that questions of
this sort require in-depth investigation sensitive both to the technical details of the mathematics
and to the physical details of how such structures may and may not bear on other phenomena we
think of as manifestly physical, even if they turn out to be indubitably inobservable.45
6.3 Physicality and Existence
What I have discussed so far in this section, I submit, are philophically rich, scientifically significant
questions and arguments, of the sort Maxwell mentions in the epigraph to this paper. Insight into
and progress on any of the questions would constitute real progress in our attempts to understand
the world in a scientific sense. The sterility of the current debate between substantivalists and
relationalists is shown in the fact that no questions it addresses has scientific value in the sense of
Maxwell—it has spurred no work with direct scientific, as opposed to purely metaphysical, import.
manifold is semi-locally simply connected presents us with yet another type of question related to physicality: strictly
speaking, there is no physical need for a manifold to possess a universal cover, and it is difficult, to say the least,
to see what other physical relevance being semi-locally simply connected could have; and yet the construction of
the universal cover is such an extraordinarily useful theoretical device that one wants to demand that a candidate
spacetime manifold be semi-locally simply connected. What status does such a demand have? A purely pragmatic
one?
43Thus giving the lie to the old chestnut that one cannot prove a negative existential statement.
44Perhaps one could posit some form of quantum entanglement among phenomena in the different components.
The ramblings of many theorists of quantum gravity notwithstanding, such a possibility lies so far beyond the
ambit of current well entrenched experimental technique and well founded theoretical knowledge as to render it
incomprehensible as physics. By the nature of the case, for instance, we could perform no direct experiments on the
putatively entangled phenomena in the postulated other component to verify the entanglement beyond a shadow of
a doubt.
45The family of phenomena in relativistic spacetimes grouped under the rubric “singular stucture” (or “singular-
ities”) provides on its own a rich and diverse selection of examples, which I do not have room even to sketch here.
See Curiel (1999) for an extended discussion.
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Still, No matter how convincing or interesting or philosophically rich these examples and argu-
ments may be, one might still want to respond that they show nothing about the possible existence
of spatiotemporal entities, and so in the end they do not bear on the debate between substanti-
valism and relationalism. I do not think that is the correct lesson to leave with, though. I take
physicality to be a necessary condition for the attribution of existence to a theoretical entity. If
there are many possible ways an entity can manifest physicality, therefore, and one can show that
different entities manifest some but not others of them, then it follows that it is meaningless to
attribute existence simpliciter to such theoretical entities. If there are two entities each manifest-
ing a different type of physicality, then, in so far as each is a necessary condition for existence, if
one attributes existence to those entities, it must be of a different sort for each. Thus, in so far as
one wants to make sense of the idea of “existence” in the context of physical entities purportedly
represented by theoretical structures (if that is the sort of thing one likes to do), it cannot be
univocal. To paraphrase Aristotle, existence is said, if at all in physics, in many ways.
What light, if any, does all this shed on the cogency of the traditional debate about the ontic
status of spacetime? I think quite a bit. A spacetime point is not physical in any of the ways I
have explicated: there is no such thing as an initial-value problem for them; there is no equation of
motion for them; no property of theirs dynamically couples to any physical field; and so on. How,
then, is one supposed to try to answer the question of whether or not they exist in any way that
purports to be grounded in physics?
7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism
I think my conclusions about the vanity of metaphysical argumentation abstracted from the prag-
matics of the scientific enterprise carry over into the general debate over realism and instrumental-
ism. Indeed, I consider the argument about relationalism and substantivalism to be an instance of
the more general form of argument one can give for existence claims about entities and structures
in science. I will consider two examples to make the point, the first somewhat sophisticated, the
second quite simple.
Consider, first, the Unruh effect.46 The effect, roughly speaking, is as follows. (We discuss it
only in the context of a special case, but this does not affect the point.) Consider two observers
in Minkowski spacetime pervaded by a scalar quantum field in its vacuum state. Each observer
carries a simple particle-detector coupled to the field, with two states: an excited state (“particle
observed”), and a ground state (“particle not observed”). Both detectors are initially in the ground
state. The first observer follows a geodesic, and so does not accelerate; in this case, quantum field
theory predicts that the particle detector will remain in the ground state, i.e., the probability that
he will detect any particles is zero, as one would expect on physical grounds, since the background
field is in the vacuum state. The second observer, however, begins to accelerate. Now, there is a
high probability that her detector will change from the ground to the excited state; she will “see
particles”. That is the Unruh effect. Even though the two observers disagree on whether there are
particles or not, they both agree that the state of the second particle detector changes, so there
is a physical fact of the matter in that sense.47 Now, the bit of most interest to us is that the
46See Wald (1994) for a rigorous exposition of the phenomenon.
47Roughly speaking, the resolution of the paradox turns on the fact that an accelerating system in Minkowski
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fluctuations in the field that determine the change in the state of the detector do not contribute
to the definition of the stress-energy tensor. All observers, both inertial and accelerating, will still
conclude that the ambient stress-energy tensor is that of the vacuum state. Is Unruh radiance,
then, physical or not? Is it “real” radiation? Well, in the sense that it is a phenomenon that all
observers will agree on, one that manifests itself in directly observable effects, yes; in the sense
that it does not contribute to the stress-energy of spacetime, no.
Now, consider the question “do electrons exist?” On its face, it seems immune to the sorts
of problems I raise about the ontic status of spatiotemporal structure. Surely one can attribute
canonical significance to the question “do electrons exist?” independent of investigative framework?
In fact, one cannot. Think of the different contexts in which the concept of an electron may come
into play, and the natural ways in those contexts one may want to attribute physicality (or not)
to electrons. A small sample:
• as a component in a quantum, non-relativistic model of the Hydrogen atom
• as an element in the relativistic computation of the Lamb shift
• as a possible “constituent” of Hawking radiation in an analysis of its spectrum
• as a measuring device in the observation of parton structure from deep inelastic scattering
of electrons off protons, as modeled by the Standard Model
In the first case, one may want to attribute physicality to the electron in so far as its associated
quantities enter into the initial-value formulation of the system’s equations of motion; in the second,
one may base the attribution on the fact that one identifies the electron as the bearer of definite
values for the kinematic Casimir invariants of spin and mass; there is no good definition in general
of an electron in the third, because there is no unambiguous, physically significant definition of
“particle” in quantum field theory on a curved spacetime, and so a fortiori no way to attribute
physicality to such a thing;48 in the fourth and final case, one can attribute physicality to the
electron because one can associate localized charge, spin and lepton number with the mass-energy
resonance that represents it. Now, one cannot even formulate in a rigorous, precise way (or, indeed,
often not even in a loose and frowzy way) the criterion for physicality in any of these frameworks
in the terms of at least some of the others.
It follows that even in this case any formulation of the question in abstract terms, such as
“what all observers agree on” or “what has manifestly observable effects” or “what couples with
other systems we already think of as physical” or “what is essential to the formulation of the
theory”, remains empty until one renders content to it by the fixation of a framework, even if only
schematic. To be clear, I do not claim that one must always make the investigative framework of
spacetime occupies a negative energy-state: the accelerating detector, in dropping to an energy level beneath that
of the ambient vacuum, registers the vacuum as having positive energy, which the accelerating observer interprets as
its having “detected a particle”; the inertial observer, however, accounts for the drop in the accelerating detector’s
energy by concluding that it emitted a particle, and so changed its state. If one likes, one may take this as one way
to make precise the idea that “particle” is not a natural notion in quantum field theory, and is indeed at times not
only not useful but downright obfuscatory.
48In essence, this is because one has no privileged group of timelike symmetries in a generic spacetime, as one has
in Minkowski spacetime, on which to ground the notion of a particle. See Wald (1994) for a detailed explanation.
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one’s work explicit, only that one ought to recognize it must be there in the background, specifiable
when push comes to shove, as it will from time to time.
In the picture I have implicitly relied on in the construction of my arguments, the structure of
physics may be thought of as something like a differential manifold itself, with different techniques
and concepts that find appropriate application in different sorts of investigation, and even in similar
sorts of investigation of different subject matters, all covering their own idiosyncratic patches of
the global manifold, consonant with each other when they overlap but with none necessarily able
to cover the entirety of the space. In that vein, I am confident there are many other interesting
senses one can render to the idea of the physicality of putative entities and structures represented
by our best physical theories, variously useful or at least illuminating in investigations of different
sorts. In some of those senses, one will rightly, or at least usefully or suggestively, say those things
are physical. In others, one will not. The words we use to further all the sorts of scientific and
philosophical investigations we pursue do not matter, only the concepts behind the words, some of
which find natural application in some investigations and some of which do not.
This is not instrumentalism. Among other things, I neither make nor rely on any claim about
how one ought to understand the structures of our best theories as formal systems, the terms
and relations with which we formulate them, and their broader or deeper relation to the world
itself, only about how we ought not understand them. The greatest physicists have always, it
seems to me, had the capacity to to think in both realist and instrumentalist ways about both the
best contemporary theories and the most promising lines of theoretical attack as they were being
developed. Often, they held both sorts of views in their minds at the same time, keeping many
avenues open, sometimes moving forward along one, sometimes switching to another, sometimes
straddling the line, as best befit the demands of the investigation, with a concomitant gain in
richness of conception and depth of thought.49 In some contexts and for some purposes it is most
useful to conceive, think and speak in realist terms, and in others to do so in instrumentalist terms.
They are both good in their place, and neither is correct sub specie æternitatis.
I am not against asking questions that, in traditional terms, seem to bear on issues of realism
and instrumentalism. I am against the focus on the questions as meaningful and valuable in
themselves, without regard to the roles they may or may not play in the ongoing enterprise of our
scientific attempts to comprehend the physical world. That focus, it seems to me, leads only to a
sterile form of ideological back-and-forth that has all but crowded out of this realm the possibility
of formulating and addressing questions of real scientific and philosophical clarity and value. I take
that to be the thrust of the epigraph from Maxwell at the head of this paper.
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